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Risk aversion when gains are likely and unlikely: evidence from
a natural experiment with large stakes
Abstract
In the television show Deal or No Deal a contestant is endowed with a sealed box, which potentially
contains a large monetary prize. In the course of the show the contestant learns more information about
the distribution of possible monetary prizes inside her box. Consider two groups of contestants, who
learned that the chances of their boxes containing a large prize are 20% and 80% correspondingly.
Contestants in both groups receive qualitatively similar price offers for selling the content of their boxes.
If contestants are less risk averse when facing unlikely gains, the price offer is likely to be more
frequently rejected in the first group than in the second group. However, the fraction of rejections is
virtually identical across two groups. Thus, contestants appear to have identical risk attitudes over
(large) gains of low and high probability.
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Risk Aversion When Gains Are Likely and Unlikely: 
Evidence from a Natural Experiment with Large Stakes 
1. Introduction 
Empirical studies find that individuals tend to exhibit a risk seeking behavior 
when dealing with risky lotteries that yield positive outcomes with small probability. At 
the same time, individuals often exhibit risk aversion when faced with lotteries that 
deliver positive outcomes with moderate or high probability. Historically, one of the first 
observations in support of this phenomenon was empirical evidence that people 
simultaneously purchase insurance and public lottery tickets (e.g. Friedman and Savage 
(1948)). Studies of betting behavior in horse races (e.g. McGlothlin (1956), Mukhtar 
(1977), Williams and Paton (1997)) also document that individual risk attitudes depend 
on the nature of risky alternatives. Specifically, the evidence from gambling in horse 
races suggests that individuals tend to undervalue horses, listed as favorites, and bet on 
long shots. 
The general tendency to prefer less risky alternatives when dealing with probable 
gains and more risky alternatives when dealing with unlikely gains is reflected in well- 
known experimental findings of the common consequence effect (e.g. the Allais paradox, 
Allais, 1953) and the common ratio effect (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
Numerous experimental studies documented risk seeking behavior over gains of low 
probability and risk aversion over gains of medium and high probability. For example, 
Cohen, Jaffray and Said (1985) find that 75% (56%) of subjects are risk seeking, i.e. they 
prefer a lottery yielding a gain with probability 1/6 (1/4) over its expected value for 
certain. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) show that subjects reveal a higher certainty 
equivalent than the expected value of a lottery in 78% of cases when probability of a gain 
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is less than 10% and only in 10% of cases when probability of a gain is higher than 50%. 
Di Mauro and Maffioletti (2004) demonstrate that in the auction setting subjects exhibit 
risk seeking behavior when they face a lottery with 3% and 20% probability of a gain, 
and risk averse behavior when probability of a gain is 50% and 80%.  
Studies of risk aversion with large outcomes of low and high probability rely only 
on hypothetical incentives. Hershey and Schoemaker (1980) find that subjects tend to 
choose a risky lottery over its expected value when the lottery yields small gain with low 
probability. However, when a hypothetical gain is large, subjects tend to be risk averse 
irrespective of whether the probability of a gain is low or high.1 Using a large 
representative sample of 3,949 Dutch respondents, Donkers, Melenberg and Van Soest 
(2001) find that individuals exhibit lower risk aversion when they face large hypothetical 
gains of low probability.2  
In this paper, we use the natural laboratory of the Italian (Affari Tuoi3) and the 
British (Deal or No Deal UK) versions of the television show Deal or No Deal with high 
monetary incentives to compare risk attitudes when contestants face lotteries with high 
and low probability of a gain. Initially produced in the Netherlands by the media 
company Endemol, Deal or No Deal has been later exported to 32 countries worldwide. 
In Deal or No Deal a contestant is assigned a sealed box containing an unknown 
monetary prize. This prize ranges from €0.01 to €500,000 in Affari Tuoi and from £0.01 
to £250,000 in Deal or No Deal UK. In the course of the show, the contestant receives 
                                                 
1 The faction of subjects, who prefer a hypothetical gain of 10,000 USD with probability p (zero otherwise) 
over its expected value for sure, remains nearly identical (27%-32%) when the value of p is 0.1%, 1%, 
10%, 50%, 90% and 99%.  
2 Only 21% of respondents prefer a 50% chance of receiving 2,000 DFL (zero otherwise) to earning 1,000 
DFL for sure. At the same time, 56% of respondents opt for 1% chance of winning 6,000 DFL over 2% 
chance of receiving 3,000 DFL. At the time of the questionnaire, the exchange rate was 1 DFL ≈ 0.50 USD. 
3 In translation from Italian “Your Business”, “Your Affairs”. 
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more information about the distribution of possible monetary prizes inside her box and 
has an opportunity to sell or exchange her box. 
We select two groups of contestants — those, who learned that there is a 20% 
probability of having a large prize inside their boxes, and those, who learned that the 
corresponding probability is 80%. Contestants in both groups receive qualitatively similar 
monetary offers for selling the content of their boxes. If Deal or No Deal contestants are 
indeed less risk averse when facing low-probability gains, contestants from the first 
group should reject such offers significantly more often than contestants from the second 
group. However, we find that the fraction of contestants who reject the price offer is 
virtually identical in both groups. This suggests that contestants have identical risk 
attitudes irrespective of whether lotteries yield positive outcomes with low or high 
probability. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an 
overview of the existing natural experiments in the television shows. Section 3 describes 
the rules of the television shows Affari Tuoi and Deal or No Deal UK. Section 4 provides 
basic statistical analysis of the recorded sample of television episodes. Section 5 presents 
our between-subject design. Section 6 summarizes the results of the natural experiment. 
Section 7 concludes. 
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2. Natural Experiments in Television Shows 
Natural experiments, provided by television shows, are often used in economic 
research to draw conclusions about various aspects of human behavior. Television shows 
provide an appealing material for economists, because these shows are often structured as 
strategic games and well-defined decision problems (Metrick (1995)). For example, 
Bennett and Hickman (1993) and Berk, Hughson and Vandezande (1996) employ the 
natural laboratory of The Price is Right to test for the optimal information updating and 
rational bidding strategies correspondingly. Levitt (2004) and Antonovics, Arcidiancono 
and Walsh (2005) examine discrimination in The Weakest Link.  
Several studies elicit individual risk attitudes using the data, obtained from the 
natural experiments. Particularly, Gertner (1993), Metrick (1995), and Beetsma and 
Schotman (2001) measure individual risk attitudes in the television shows Card Sharks, 
Jeopardy! and Lingo respectively. Due to its simple design and high monetary incentives, 
Deal or No Deal television show has attracted economic researchers as a perfect 
laboratory for studying individual decision making under risk.  
Post et al. (2004) analyze the decisions of contestants in the Belgian, Dutch and 
German version of Deal or No Deal television show. They assume that all contestants 
have constant relative risk aversion utility function and either zero wealth or an ad hoc 
wealth of €250,000. Post et al. (2004) also estimate a parametric form of cumulative 
prospect theory with so-called Quiggin’s probability weighting function and an ad hoc 
reference point (either zero, or current monetary offer, or the highest offer).  
Post et al. (2004) find that the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk             
aversion (estimated for every contestant) sharply decreases after a contestant learns that 
her box does not contain large prize(s). Since such unlucky contestants are likely to end 
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up facing a gain with small probability, this finding may be interpreted as an indirect 
evidence of contestants being less risk averse when facing low-probability gains. 
However, Post et al. (2004) find that contestants typically face similar distribution of 
monetary prizes in their recorded sample. Thus, direct testing of whether Belgian, Dutch 
or German contestants overvalue (undervalue) the gains of low (high) probability does 
not seem to be feasible. 
Bombardini and Trebbi (2005) analyze the decisions of contestants in Affari Tuoi 
television show. They assume that all contestants have constant relative risk aversion and 
use instrumental variables to estimate the wealth of every contestant based on their 
profession and place of residence. Bombardini and Trebbi (2005) also estimate a 
parametric form of (original) prospect theory without editing phase using power 
probability weighting function and a zero reference point. They find that contestants are 
close to risk neutrality, when lotteries involve small outcomes, and that contestants are 
generally risk averse, when lotteries involve large outcomes. 
Using several unique features of the show, Mulino et al. (2006) and de Roos and 
Sarafidis (2006) measure risk attitudes and study the endowment effect in the Australian 
version of Deal or No Deal. Deck et al. (2006) elicit risk preferences of Deal or No Deal 
contestants using the natural laboratory of the Mexican version of the television                  
show (Vas o No Vas). Botti et al. (2006) analyze risk attitudes in Affari Tuoi under 
different theoretical specifications, particularly concentrating on the unobserved 
heterogeneity of the Italian contestants. Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2006) analyze 
exchange offers in Affari Tuoi and find that contestants do not appear to be 
predominantly loss averse when facing lotteries with large outcomes. 
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Studies on various versions of Deal or No Deal mentioned above, with the 
exception of Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2006), conduct a parametric estimation of 
expected utility theory or one of its generalizations. In contrast, this paper follows a non-
parametric approach. We study risk aversion in a between subject design without 
assuming that individual preferences are represented by a specific decision theory with 
particular functional forms for utility function, probability weighting function etc. 
3. Format of the Television Show 
Affari Tuoi and Deal or No Deal UK are versions of the well-known television 
show Deal or No Deal, aired six days a week with an exception of Sunday on the national 
channels of Italian and British television respectively. In order to become a contestant, 
interested candidates have to apply to the countrywide selection centers. In other words, 
all contestants self-select into the show.4  
In the Italian version, twenty contestants, representing different administrative 
regions of Italy, compete for the opportunity to play the game in every television episode. 
Twenty two contestants appear in the British version. All contestants receive identical 
boxes, numbered consecutively from the first to the last.  
Each box contains a monetary prize ranging from €0.01 to €500,000 in the Italian 
version (e.g. Figure 1) and from £0.01 to £250,000 in the British version (e.g. Figure 2).5 
In the Affari Tuoi television show boxes are randomly assigned and sealed by an 
independent notary company. In Deal or No Deal UK prizes are distributed across boxes 
by an independent adjudicator, however, contestants choose their boxes at random by 
drawing numbered ping-pong balls. 
                                                 
4 According to Bombardini and Trebbi (2005), Italian contestants are selected from the pool of interested 
candidates based on two criteria: entertaining appearance and income (wealthy candidates are discarded). 
5 At the time of the broadcasts the exchange rate was £1= €1.47947. 
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Figure 1 A typical screenshot with a list of possible prizes  
at the beginning of the game in Affari Tuoi6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 A typical screenshot with a list of possible prizes 
at the beginning of the game in Deal or No Deal UK 
In both versions of the show contestants know the list of potential prizes but they 
do not know the content of each box. In Affari Tuoi every television episode consists of 
two phases – the selection phase and the game itself. During the selection phase 
contestants receive one multiple-choice general knowledge question. The contestant, who 
is the first to answer this question correctly, is selected to play the game. The remaining 
contestants (waiting contestants) continue to participate in the next television episode.  
                                                 
6 Prize €5,000 was replaced with prize €30,000 starting from January 30, 2006 
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The British version of the show does not have a selection phase. The contestant is 
pre-selected by the producers and, therefore, it is quite rare for contestants to wait for 
more than 30 shows before they receive an opportunity to play the game. However, 
waiting contestants do not know in advance when they will be selected. 
During the game, the contestant keeps her own box and opens the remaining 
boxes one by one. Once a box is opened, the prize sealed inside is publicly revealed and 
deleted from the list of possible prizes. The more boxes the contestant opens, the more 
information she obtains about the distribution of possible prizes inside her own box. The 
goal of the contestant is to open as many boxes with small prizes as possible to increase 
her chances of winning a large prize. 
After opening several boxes the contestant receives an offer from the “bank”. This 
offer could be either a monetary price for the content of her box or the possibility to 
exchange her box for any of the remaining sealed boxes.7  
Monetary offers are fairly predictable across episodes and follow a general pattern. 
In the early stages of the game, they are smaller than the expected value of possible prizes. 
As the game progresses, the gap between the expected value and a monetary offer 
decreases and often disappears when there are two unopened boxes left. The game 
terminates when either the contestant accepts the price offered by the “bank” or when all 
boxes are opened. In the former case, the content of all remaining unopened boxes is 
revealed. In the latter case, the contestant leaves with the content of her box, which is 
opened last. Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the timing of “bank” offers in the Italian and the 
British versions of the show respectively. 
                                                 
7 Official rules of Affari Tuoi require the “bank” to offer exchange option at least once in every television 
episode. Therefore, the first offer that the “bank” makes is always the exchange offer. Before February 9, 
2006, the first offer was always made after the contestant opened six boxes. Starting from February 9, 
2006, the first offer was made after the contestant opened three boxes. In Deal or No Deal UK exchange 
offer is normally made when there are only two unopened boxes left and the contestant has rejected the last 
monetary offer. 
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Figure 3 Timing of “bank” offers in Affari Tuoi television 
episodes before February 9, 2006 (left chart) and starting 
from February 9, 2006 (right chart) 
 
 Figure 4 Timing of “bank” offers in 
Deal or No Deal UK television episodes 
Contestant opens 
five boxes
“Bank” offers a price for contestant’s box  
(17 boxes remain unopened)
“Bank” offers a price for contestant’s box  
(14 boxes remain unopened)
“Bank” offers a price for contestant’s box  
(11 boxes remain unopened)
“Bank” offers a price for contestant’s box  
(8 boxes remain unopened)
“Bank” offers a price for contestant’s box  
(5 boxes remain unopened)
Contestant accepts the 
price 
“Bank” offers a price for contestant’s box  
(2 boxes remain unopened)
Contestant rejects 
the price 
Contestant accepts the 
price 
Contestant opens 
three boxes
Contestant opens 
three boxes
Contestant accepts the 
price 
Contestant accepts the 
price 
Contestant opens 
three boxes
Contestant accepts the 
price 
Contestant opens 
three boxes
Contestant opens 
three boxes
Contestant accepts the 
price 
Contestant opens 
two boxes 
“Bank” offers to exchange contestant’s own 
box for the remaining box
“Bank” offers a price or an exchange (if 
there are at least two unopened boxes)
Contestant opens 
three boxes
“Bank” offers to exchange her own box  
for any of 16 remaining unopened boxes
Contestant opens 
three boxes
“Bank” offers a price for contestant’s box 
(14 boxes remain unopened)
Contestant opens 
three boxes
Contestant 
accepts the price 
“Bank” offers a price for contestant’s box 
(11 boxes remain unopened)
Contestant 
accepts the price 
Contestant opens 
three boxes
“Bank” offers a price for contestant’s box 
(8 boxes remain unopened)
Contestant opens 
three boxes
Contestant 
accepts the price 
“Bank” offers a price for contestant’s box 
(5 boxes remain unopened)
Contestant 
accepts the price 
Contestant opens 
one box
Contestant 
accepts the price 
Contestant opens 
one box 
Contestant opens 
six boxes 
“Bank” offers to exchange her own box  
for any of 13 remaining unopened boxes
Contestant opens 
three boxes 
“Bank” offers a price for contestant’s box 
(11 boxes remain unopened)
Contestant opens 
three boxes
Contestant 
accepts the price 
“Bank” offers a price or an exchange  
(8 boxes remain unopened)
Contestant 
accepts the price 
Contestant opens 
three boxes
“Bank” offers a price or an exchange  
(5 boxes remain unopened)
Contestant opens 
three boxes
Contestant 
accepts the price 
“Bank” offers a price or an exchange  
(2 boxes remain unopened)
Contestant 
accepts the price 
Contestant opens 
two boxes
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4. Basic Statistics 
Data, analyzed in this paper, were derived from two sources. Data on the Italian 
version of Deal or No Deal were transcribed from original RAI Uno broadcasts of Affari 
Tuoi from September 20, 2005 to March 4, 2006. To obtain the data from the British 
version of the show we used several Internet portals with description of the television 
episodes and game statistics.8 This information was collected by the viewers of Deal or 
No Deal from Channel 4 broadcasts aired from October 31, 2005 to September 21, 2006. 
The resulting natural laboratory contained 114 Affari Tuoi episodes and 256 Deal 
or No Deal UK episodes. Only one contestant played the game in every episode. In both 
versions of the show, the contestant, selected to play the game, had to decide on at least 
one monetary offer.9 In the Italian version of the show the contestant also had to decide 
on at least one exchange offer. We recorded the distribution of all possible prizes that a 
contestant could potentially win at the moment when she made each decision as well as 
the prize sealed inside her own box (which was revealed only at the end of the show). 
In the beginning of a television episode in both versions of the show, the 
contestant, selected to play the game, states her name, place of current residence, marital 
status and, less often, age and occupation. Some personal characteristics of the 
contestants in Affari Tuoi and Deal or No Deal UK are briefly summarized in Table 1.  
                                                 
8 Particularly, a significant portion of the data was compiled from 
http://donduk.blogspot.com/2006/06/previous-game-reports.html and related Internet sources. We have also 
watched several episodes, available online, including the Hall of Fame editions of the show with Deal or 
No Deal UK highlights. We are particularly grateful to Dave Woollin for collecting show statistics and 
publishing it on the web site http://www.screwthebanker.com and to Morten Lau for providing information 
on personal characteristics of contestants. 
9 In our recorded sample, Affari Tuoi contestants always rejected a monetary offer when 14 boxes remained 
unopened. Only one Affari Tuoi contestant accepted a monetary offer (€18,000) when 11 boxes remained 
unopened (which was his first monetary offer). Ten contestants accepted monetary offer when 8 boxes 
remained unopened. 34 contestants accepted their third monetary offer (when 5 boxes remained unopened). 
All remaining contestants received from 4 to 7 monetary offers.  In Deal or No Deal UK all contestants 
rejected the first two monetary offers, 9 contestants accepted the third monetary offer (when 11 boxes 
remained unopened) and the remaining contestants received from 4 to 7 monetary offers. 
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According to their self-reported data, contestants greatly varied in their age in 
both versions of the show. However, average age of contestants in Affari Tuoi was higher 
than that of contestants in Deal or No Deal UK. In terms of the gender composition, the 
share of female contestants was greater than that of male contestants in Affari Tuoi 
sample, while in Deal or No Deal UK data set men were selected to play the game more 
often then women. The majority of contestants in both versions of the show were married. 
Personal Characteristic Affari Tuoi  (114 contestants) 
Deal or No Deal UK 
(256 contestants) 
Male 52 (45.6%) 129 (50.4%) 
Female 62 (54.4%) 127 (49.6%) 
Married 90 (78.9%) 55 (50.9%)* 
Single 16 (14.0%) 52 (48.1%)* 
Divorced 6 (5.3%) 0 (0.0%)* 
Widowed 2 (1.8%) 1 (0.9%)* 
Minimum reported age 23 20** 
Maximum reported age 70 83** 
Average age 46.3 43.9** 
* Marital status data for Deal or No Deal UK were available for 108 contestants (42.2%) 
** Age data for Deal or No Deal UK were collected for 196 contestants (76.6%) 
Table 1 Personal characteristics Affari Tuoi and Deal or No Deal UK contestants 
 
In our Affari Tuoi data set, representative of every Italian region played the game 
at least once. Contestants from Lombardia played the game most frequently (10 times), 
while a contestant from Campania played the game only once. In Deal or No Deal UK, 
representatives of 22 administrative regions of the United Kingdom appeared on the show 
in the “hot seat”. Contestants from Yorkshire played the game most often — 8 times (we 
collected data on administrative regions for 23% of contestants, who played the game in 
the British version of the show).  
Therefore, the demographics, age and personal characteristics of Affari Tuoi and 
Deal or No Deal UK contestants make them a more representative subject pool than 
standard pools, composed primarily of undergraduate students. Moreover, obtaining a 
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similar data set in conventional laboratory conditions would be a highly ambitious 
project, since it would require a total budget of approximately 9 million euros (e.g. Table 
2). 
Potentially, in Affari Tuoi and in Deal or No Deal UK any contestant, selected to 
play the game, can earn a maximum prize of €500,000 and £250,000 respectively. 
However, the actual earnings of contestants in both versions were significantly lower 
than the maximum (e.g. Table 2). Figure 5 and Figure 6 depict the distribution of final 
earnings in Affari Tuoi and Deal or No Deal UK correspondingly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Distribution of final earnings across 114 episodes in Affari Tuoi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Distribution of final earnings across 256 episodes in Deal or No Deal UK  
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Table 2 provides some statistics on earnings of contestants in both versions of the 
show. Both in Affari Tuoi and in Deal or No Deal UK men earned on average more 
money than women.  However, irrespective of the gender, average earnings in both 
versions of the show were significantly lower than the ex ante expected value of the 
prizes from Figure 1 (€52,295) and Figure 2 (£25,712) correspondingly.  
Category Affari Tuoi  (114 episodes)
Deal or No 
Deal UK 
(256 episodes) 
Total money paid out by the “bank” to contestants €3,364,852 £4,102,953 
Maximum actual earnings €250,000 £120,000 
Minimum actual earnings €0.01 £0.01 
Average earnings for all contestants €29,516 £16,027 
Median earnings for all contestants €19,000 £12,200 
Standard deviation of earnings for all contestants €42,120 £16,605 
Average earnings for male contestants €31,582 £16,090 
Median earnings for male contestants €20,000 £12,000 
Standard deviation of earnings for male contestants €48,271 £16,868 
Average earnings for female contestants €27,784 £15,963 
Median earnings for female contestants €17,000 £12,900 
Standard deviation of earnings for female contestants €36,491 £16,400 
Average stake in initial box, assigned to contestant €41,279 £19,838 
Median stake in initial box, assigned to contestant €250 £500 
Ex ante expected value of the prizes  €52,295 £25,712 
Table 2 Summary statistics on earnings of contestants in 
Affari Tuoi and Deal or No Deal UK 
Furthermore, in both versions of the show average earnings were also lower than 
the average prize in boxes, initially assigned to contestants who played the game. In both 
versions of the show the distribution of initial endowments was not significantly different 
from a uniform distribution (χ2 = 22.49 and p=0.2605 in Affari Tuoi and χ2 = 20.89 and 
p=0.4656 in Deal or No Deal UK). 
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5. Natural Experiment  
The main idea of our between-subject design is to identify two groups of 
contestants — those who learned that there is a small chance of a large prize inside their 
box and those who learned that this chance is high—and to compare the rejection rates 
for “bank” monetary offers across two groups. In order to select two groups we use the 
stage of the game when five unopened boxes are left and the probability of receiving each 
of five possible prizes is 20%.10 Specifically, contestants in the first group have learned 
that the chances of a large prize inside their box are one to five. Contestants in the second 
group have learned that the corresponding chances are four to five.  
In conventional laboratory experiments, which test for risk attitudes across 
various types of probabilistic distributions, subjects typically face a lottery with only one 
positive outcome of varied probability (e.g. Cohen et al. (1985)). In this natural 
experiment contestants face lotteries with five positive outcomes. Since we manipulate 
the probability of receiving a large prize across two groups, we need to provide a 
definition of a “large prize” for each version of the show. Figure 1 and Figure 2 offer two 
natural thresholds for distinguishing between large and small prizes. In Affari Tuoi €500 
is the last “blue” prize, which appears on the left hand side of the prize table (e.g. Figure 
1). Furthermore, all prizes below €500 are significantly (at least 10 times) smaller than all 
prizes above €500. In Deal or No Deal UK £750 is the last “blue” prize, which appears 
on the left hand side of the prize table (e.g. Figure 2). Thus, we identify a contestant as a 
member of the first (second) group if after opening 15 or 17 boxes she learns that there is 
a 20% (80%) probability that the prize inside her box exceeds €500 or £750 respectively. 
                                                 
10 In the later stage of the game contestants choose between fifty-fifty gambles and the offer of the “bank”, 
which does not allow for distinguishing between contestants who face likely and unlikely gains. In the 
earlier stages of the game, there is no sufficient variability in the data (e.g. Footnote 9, p. 2) 
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A natural way to compare risk attitudes across two groups is to contrast the 
decisions of their members when they are offered the expected value of possible prizes 
for forgoing the content of their box. However, when five boxes remain unopened, 
“bank” monetary offers in Affari Tuoi are always below the expected value of possible 
prizes and “bank” offers in Deal or No Deal UK are less than actuarially fair in 98.9% of 
all cases.11 
A precise mechanism of setting “bank” monetary offers is not revealed in the 
show regulations. Bombardini and Trebbi (2005) suggest that offers in Affari Tuoi can be 
modeled as informative signals about the prize sealed inside a contestant’s box that the 
“bank” sends to the contestant. De Roos and Sarafidis (2006) conduct a regression 
analysis of “bank” offers in the Australian version of Deal or No Deal and find that the 
variability in “bank” offers is largely explained by the expected value of the remaining 
prizes but not by the prize hidden inside a contestant’s briefcase. Given these different 
models of “bank” offers suggested in the literature, we investigate the determinants of 
“bank” offers in our recorded sample. 
Table 3 presents the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
εXXlnO 111 ++++= 1110 ... βββ  of monetary amounts O  that the “bank” offered in 
exchange for risky lotteries in Italian and British versions of the show. Explanatory 
variables 111 XX ,...,  consist of lottery specific variables (mean, median, and standard 
deviation of possible prizes, number of possible prizes etc.) and socio-demographic 
characteristics of the contestants (gender, age, marital status and region). 
                                                 
11 In our Deal or No Deal UK sample of observations, the “bank” made four more than actuarially fair 
offers to contestants. Two of these offers were made when five boxes remained unopened and the other two 
– when two boxes remained unopened. 
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Regression coefficient (standard error) Explanatory variables 
Affari Tuoi Deal or No Deal UK 
Lottery specific variables: 
Constant -0.4982
* 
(0.2078) 
-0.7219*** 
(0.2085) 
-0.4894 
(0.2612) 
-0.5606*** 
(0.1615) 
-0.5333*** 
(0.1581) 
-0.5235** 
(0.1809) 
Natural logarithm of expected value of 
possible prizes 
0.9956*** 
(0.0205) 
1.5026*** 
(0.1184) 
1.3828*** 
(0.1557) 
1.0595*** 
(0.0175) 
1.4976*** 
(0.1186) 
1.4424*** 
(0.1306) 
Natural logarithm of a median possible 
prize  
0.0132 
(0.0160) 
0.0020 
(0.0185)  
0.0509* 
(0.0174) 
0.0405 
(0.0210) 
Natural logarithm of standard deviation 
of possible prizes  
-0.5073*** 
(0.1055) 
-0.4118** 
(0.1331)  
-0.4728*** 
(0.1064) 
-0.4277*** 
(0.1153) 
Natural logarithm of the prize hidden 
inside a contestant’s box  
0.0044 
(0.0063) 
0.0022 
(0.0064)  
0.0064 
(0.0042) 
0.0064 
(0.0043) 
Number of possible prizes in a lottery -0.0931
*** 
(0.0098) 
-0.051*** 
(0.0119) 
-0.0549*** 
(0.0123) 
-0.1198*** 
(0.0045) 
-0.1009*** 
(0.0051) 
-0.1016*** 
(0.0051) 
Probability of large prize (> €500 in Affari 
Tuoi, > £750 in Deal or No Deal UK)   
0.4103 
(0.3415)   
0.2283 
(0.2450) 
Individual specific variables: 
Gender dummy (0 – female, 1 – male)   0.0678 (0.0601)   
-0.0094 
(0.0390) 
Self-reported age (in years) or estimate 
based on physical appearance   
-0.0022 
(0.0027)   
0.0002 
(0.0015) 
Marital status (0 – married, 1 – single, 2 
– divorced, and 3 – widowed)   
0.0369 
(0.0478)   
0.0312 
(0.0550) 
Region dummy (0 for the region with the 
lowest income per capita)   
-0.0043 
(0.0050)   
0.0003 
(0.0030) 
R2 0.8567 0.8693 0.8708 0.7401 0.7535 0.7537 
Adjusted R2 0.8560 0.8676 0.8675 0.7397 0.7525 0.7520 
*   significant at 5% significance level   **  significant at 1% significance level   *** significant at 0.1% significance level 
Table 3 OLS regression results for “bank” monetary offers in Affari Tuoi (N=402) and Deal or No Deal UK (N=1,300), 
dependent variable—natural logarithm of a price offered by the “bank”. 
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The second and the fifth column of Table 3 demonstrate that around 85% of total 
variability in monetary offers in Affari Tuoi and around 74% of total variability in 
monetary offers in Deal or No Deal UK is explained by the expected value and the 
number of possible prizes left. In both versions of the show the “bank” makes higher 
offers when the number of possible prizes decreases, i.e. the game approaches the end. 
Regression coefficient on the standard deviation of possible prizes is also significant (the 
more dispersed are the prizes, the lower is the offer). However, regression coefficient of 
the prize hidden inside a contestant’s box is never statistically significant. Thus, there is 
no information content of “bank” offers and, therefore, it is impossible for contestants to 
deduce the content of their boxes from the monetary offers that they receive.  
Moreover, in both versions of the show contestants in the first group and in the 
second group receive qualitatively similar monetary offers from the bank i.e. the bank 
does not systematically offer less attractive prices for contestants in one of the groups. 
Table 3 shows that “bank” offers do not depend on the probability of receiving a large 
prize. Contestants are allocated across two groups according to their chances of receiving 
a large prize, when five boxes remain unopened. Thus, the “bank” does not discriminate 
between contestants in the first group and contestants in the second group when making a 
monetary offer.  
6. Results  
Affari Tuoi and Deal or No Deal UK contestants are allocated across two groups 
at random (as a result of pure chance events). Moreover, at a given stage of the game, the 
representatives of two groups receive qualitatively similar offers that are highly 
correlated with the expected value of possible prizes. This allows us to formulate our 
testing hypotheses as follows: 
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Hypothesis I The fraction of contestants who reject monetary offers from the 
“bank” is the same in two groups if there are no systematic differences in risk attitudes 
across two groups. 
Hypothesis II The fraction of contestants who reject monetary offers from the 
“bank” is significantly higher in the first group if its members are less risk averse than the 
members of the second group.  
In our Affari Tuoi sample of 114 television episodes, 13 contestants are identified 
as the members of the first group and 20 contestants — as the members of the second 
group. In the British data set of 256 television episodes, 23 contestants are classified as 
the members of the first group and 25 contestants – as the members of the second group. 
Table 4 and Table 5 show how many contestants in each group reject/accept a monetary 
offer when five boxes remain unopened. In both versions of the show, the 
rejection/acceptance rates are remarkably similar across two groups (p-value for Fisher’s 
exact probability test is 0.5535 and 0.3490 for Affari Tuoi and Deal or No Deal UK 
correspondingly). Therefore, we cannot reject Hypothesis I that risk attitudes are identical 
across two groups. Apparently, Deal or No Deal contestants in Italy and the UK do not 
become less risk averse when facing large gains of small probability.12 
Number (percentage) of contestants who…Group 
Reject “bank” offer Accept “bank” offer
First group, ( >Prizeprob € ) 51500 =  9 (69.2%) 4 (30.8%) 
Second group, ( >Prizeprob € ) 54500 =  13 (65.0%) 7 (35.0%) 
Table 4 Rejection/acceptance rates for “bank” monetary offers across two groups in 
Affari Tuoi 
                                                 
12 We also checked if this conclusion depends on the threshold of what constitutes a “large” prize. 
Remarkably, the rejection rates across two groups remain nearly identical when the threshold is varied 
across all possible values between €5 and €30,000 in Affari Tuoi and between £1 and £35,000 in Deal or 
No Deal UK (with p-values for Fisher’s exact probability test being between 0.1871 and 0.7073). Details of 
this analysis are available from authors on request. 
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Number (percentage) of contestants who…Group 
Reject “bank” offer Accept “bank” offer
First group, ( >Prizeprob £ ) 51750 =  16 (69.6%) 7 (30.4%) 
Second group, ( >Prizeprob £ ) 54750 =  15 (60.0%) 10 (40.0%) 
Table 5 Rejection/acceptance rates for “bank” monetary offers across two groups in 
Deal or No Deal UK 
The design of Affari Tuoi has slightly changed starting from February 9, 2006. In 
the television episodes broadcasted before this date, a contestant, who rejects a monetary 
offer when five boxes remain unopened, receives the next “bank” offer after opening 
three boxes. In the episodes aired starting from February 9, 2006, such contestant 
receives the next “bank” offer each time she opens one box (e.g. Figure 3). Thus, the 
optional value of rejecting a monetary offer for a distribution of five prizes is higher in 
the episodes starting from February 9, 2006.  
One can argue that contestants, who participated in Affari Tuoi after the change in 
design, are more likely to reject monetary offers, when five boxes remain unopened. In 
our recorded sample, out of 82 contestants, who received a monetary offer for a 
distribution of five prizes before February 9, 2006, 51 contestants rejected the offer. 
Starting from February 9, 2006, 14 contestants received a monetary offer when five 
boxes remained unopened and 11 of them rejected the offer. Although the rejection rate 
increased from 62.2% to 78.6% after the change in design, this effect does not appear to 
be statistically significant (p-value for Fisher’s exact probability test is 0.1908). 
In our recorded sample 3 contestants from the first group and 2 contestants from 
the second group have participated in Affari Tuoi starting from February 9, 2006. Thus, if 
these contestants are indeed more likely to reject the monetary offers for a distribution of 
five prizes, this effect may be expected to be either similar for both groups or reinforcing 
the fraction of rejections in the first group.  
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7. Conclusion  
This paper uses the natural laboratory of the Italian and the British versions of the 
television show Deal or No Deal to test if individuals exhibit lower risk aversion when 
dealing with risky lotteries that yield (large) gains of low probability. Such lower risk 
aversion (and even risk seeking behavior) over unlikely gains is persistently documented 
in numerous experimental studies though evidence in the domain of large gains relies on 
hypothetical incentives. The natural experiment in Deal or No Deal offers a unique 
opportunity to explore this phenomenon with real incentives (prizes up to half a million 
euros) and real people (representatives of the Italian and the British population, widely 
dispersed in terms of age and occupation). 
Using a between-subject design and a non-parametric approach, we compare the 
decisions of two groups of contestants on qualitatively similar price offers for a risky 
lottery that delivers a large outcome with probability 20% in the first group and 80% in 
the second group. The fraction of contestants, who reject the monetary offer, is nearly 
identical across two groups, contrary to the expectation that it should be higher in the first 
group. This finding suggests that contestants in the Italian and the British versions of the 
television show Deal or No Deal do not become less risk averse when facing large gains 
of small probability. 
Our results seem to confirm the findings of Hershey and Schoemaker (1980) that 
individuals are not prone to lower risk aversion when dealing with large improbable gains 
(e.g. Footnote 1). Thus, a frequently observed phenomenon that people overvalue risky 
lotteries delivering a relatively small positive outcome with low probability does not 
appear to hold with risky lotteries yielding a large positive outcome with low probability. 
Apparently, individuals reveal identical risk attitudes when the probability of a large gain 
 22
is low and when it is high. This finding provides indirect support for the descriptive 
validity of expected utility theory for decisions involving lotteries with large outcomes.  
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